Abstract. We study how electronic markets that facilitate broader inter-firm transactions affect the vertical scope of emerging IT-enabled extended enterprises. We do so by modeling firms in a three-tier value chain who are each connected to a common electronic market that facilitates direct business transactions across tiers, and that lowers the search costs associated with finding an appropriate trading partner for each of them. The extent to which search costs are reduced depends on the complexity of B2B search, and the nature of the supporting technologies that the electronic market facilitates. Variation in search costs affect firms across the value chain in three key ways: by a change in the transaction costs of interaction between firms; by a change in the contracting costs associated with outsourcing owing to changes in the costs of moral hazard for delegated search, and by a change in the price dispersion of upstream input commodities. We capture each of these effects in a new model that integrates search theory into the principal-agent framework, and establish that the optimal outsourcing contract has a simple "all or nothing" performance-based structure under fairly general assumptions. We then apply this model to contrast the effect that different information technologies have on the relative B2B search costs of different firms in the value chain, contrasting the predicted changes of proportionate, constant and convergent changes in search costs. When integrated with a detailed analysis of the nature of B2B search, these results predicts that when B2B search is information-intensive, electronic markets will facilitate an increase in outsourcing, market-based transactions and a reduction in the vertical scope of extended enterprises. In contrast, when B2B search is primarily communication-intensive, electronic markets will lead to tighter integration and an increase in the vertical scope of the extended enterprise. Our research suggest that the nature of the information technologies and of the business activities supported by an electronic market are crucial determinants of the organizational and industry changes they induce, and our results have important implications for a variety of industries in which both technological and agency issues will influence the eventual success of global IT-facilitated extended enterprise initiatives. 0 We thank
Introduction
The IT infrastructure created by investments in electronic B2B markets over the last few years facilitates a new array of inter-firm transactions and enterprise forms. As these "extended enterprises" become increasingly viable, they raise new variants of classic organization design and governance questions. Since the shared interorganizational systems (IOS) of B2B markets make outsourced relationships more easily viable, should firms take advantage of these reduced transaction costs to shrink their scope, and focus on their core competencies, while remaining part of a loosely coupled extended enterprise? Or rather, should they exploit the fact that these very same shared IOS and IT platforms of B2B markets facilitate supplier reach and transaction capability across the supply chain, thereby potentially disintermediating those intermediaries whose business models relied on transaction costs asymmetries that these electronic markets have largely eliminated, and making viable an integrated enterprise that extends vertically upstream? At first glance, either scenario seems to be economically justifiable.
In this paper, we explore this trade-off by studying how electronic business-to-business markets affect the vertical scope of the extended enterprises that use them. We do so by modeling the sourcing decision of a downstream firm in a three-tier value chain. Firms in each tier of the value chain are connected to a common electronic market that facilitates direct business transactions across tiers, and lowers the search costs associated with the activities of all the firms in the value chain. In contrast with consumer search, B2B search is considerably more complex and nuanced, and changes in these search costs induces three key effects: a change in the transaction costs for firms across the tiers of the value chain; a change in the contracting costs associated with outsourcing owing to changes in the costs of moral hazard for delegated search, and a change in the price dispersion of upstream input commodities. We capture each of these effects in a new model that integrates search theory into the principal-agent framework, and establish that the optimal outsourcing contract has a simple "all or nothing" performance-based structure under fairly general assumptions. We apply this model to contrast the effect that commonly used information technologies have on the relative B2B search costs of different firms in the value chain, and establish conditions under which the electronic market will increase the scope and integration of an extended enterprise, and conditions under which it will lead to increased outsourcing and a loosely coupled extended enterprise. These results, along with a detailed analysis of B2B search, lead to a contrast between information-intensive and communication-intensive search: the effect of IT of each of these is associated with a different prescribed model for scope and integration.
A simple context that our model describes quite literally is that of procurement outsourcing, a growing phenomenon enabled by electronic markets. A 2003 survey of senior executives by Accenture found that 9% of companies (projected to grow to 22% by 2006) surveyed used procurement service providers (PSPs), rather than in-house procurement divisions, for direct materials and services, while 20% of them (projected to grow to 43% by 2006) use PSPs for indirect materials and services. Similarly, a more recent survey (conducted in 2004) by A. T. Kearney, finds that between 9% and 20% of companies outsource procurement activities related to maintenance, repair and operating supplies (MRO), and 11% to 17% of them outsource procurement activities related to indirect materials, compared to just 4% to 9% of companies that outsource procurement related to direct materials. These survey results are striking, because they highlight how the extent of outsourcing of the procurement function -often considered of key strategic importance (Wolf, 2005) -varies between indirect/MRO inputs and direct inputs. Our model suggests these differences, based on a contrast between the nature of B2B search associated with MRO/indirect inputs and direct inputs.
In order to place our work in the existing literature we first briefly summarize our model and its results. We model an industry with a three-tier vertical value chain. There is one downstream manufacturer of final goods, an intermediary (tier-1 supplier) to whom the production of complex parts may be outsourced, and upstream (tier-2) suppliers of commodity or near-commodity inputs to this complex part 3 . The outsourcing decision of the manufacturer is influenced by the lowering of search costs through three effects: (1) a reduction in the direct transaction cost of procurement for manufacturers, suggesting less outsourcing and higher vertical scope for the extended enterprise, (2) a reduction in the dispersion of commodity input prices, since these prices and the extent of dispersion is influenced by the level of search costs, and by who (manufacturer or intermediary) does the searching, and. (3) reduction in contracting (agency) costs associated with outsourcing, suggesting more procurement-outsourcing and lower vertical integration for the extended enterprise 4 . Since the manufacturer is usually unable to observe the intermediary's search effort, it faces costs associated with moral hazard, the extent of which depends on the intermediary's search cost (which may also be lowered by the electronic market), and by the changes in commodity price dispersion.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we derive the optimal cost-plus outsourcing contract for the manufacturer, and show that it has a simple two-part structure, with a fixed performance trigger. This is interesting because we allow the buyer to optimize over contracts of any functional form, and despite this generality, the optimal contract has a simple and easily implementable form.
Next, we use this optimal contract to frame the make vs. buy decision, and to examine how this decision is affected by different kinds of changes in relative search costs. First, if B2B search 3 An illustrative situation is the auto industry. A manufacturer like General Motors buys most of its car seats, a complex intermediate part, from an intermediary parts supplier like Delphi. The sourcing of commoditiy inputs such as plastic and steel, and subsequent production of car seats, could be handled by GM or Delphi, depending on which company has an overall relative advantage. In fact, it has been handled by both of these companies at different times, and recent trade press articles suggest that GM may return to in-house sourcing and production of the parts it currently sources from Delphi (Arndt and Welch, 2005) . 4 We thus move well beyond simple intuition which suggests that if electronic markets lower the search costs of a buyer, in a simple buyer-supplier scenario, buyers will outsource more. This ignores the crucial role intermediaries play in multi-tier industies. When there are many layers of intermediaries as well, electronic markets may lower search costs for buyers as well as intermediaries. If these markets confer a relative advantage to buyers (intermediaries), then the buyers (intermediaries) will perform the transactions, which will leading to relatively less (more) outsourcing, and more (less) vertical scope. and transactions are information-intensive, involving collecting and processing product information from non-personal or published sources, technologies like online product catalogs, Internet-based supplier portals, and product/price comparison engines induce constant decreases in search costs across the tiers of the value chain, for both the manufacturer and the intermediary. In this case, our model shows that the lowering of agency cost dominates the benefits from lower search costs, leading to more outsourcing, a decrease in vertical integration and a more loosely coupled extended enterprise. In contrast, if B2B search involves extensive communication (as suggested by the industrial marketing literature, which we discuss at length later in the paper), then marketplace communication platforms like EDI, XML and related collaborative systems reduce the unit cost of each communication iteration/step. B2B search costs then decrease proportionately for the manufacturer and intermediary, with the differences reflecting prior expertise and number of iterations before a final price is obtained. In this case, we show that the decrease in the buyer's search cost often dominates the decrease in her contracting costs, which leads to less outsourcing, an increase in scope, and a more vertical integrated extended enterprise. Finally, if shared procurement technologies and processes cause search costs for electronic market participants to converge to a common lower value, our model predicts an increase in vertical integration, though our emphasis is on the first two scenarios.
Our research adds to a rich and varied literature on information systems and interorganizational transactions. One might first bifurcate this literature into two broad streams: (1) related to the organizational issues associated with contracting for and sourcing of information systems and technologies, and (2) relating to the enabling aspects of information systems in changing interactions across organizations. The former literature has studied some contracting issues related to ours, such as its role in software outsourcing (Richmond, Seidmann and Whinston, 1992; Whang, 1992 The nature of IOS: This literature has highlighted, among other things, the need for business partner re-engineering , competing approaches to measuring EDI usage through volume, diversity, breadth and depth of usage (Massetti and Zmud, 1996) , the importance of merging technological and process innovations (Clark and Stoddard, 1996) , how domain expertise confers strategic advantage to firms using IOS (Christiaanse and Venkatraman, 2002) , the use of options to integrate spot and long-term contracts in B2B exchanges , and why IOS should provide flexibility so that firms can change offerings and partners (Gosain, Malhotra and El Sawy, 2005) .
The adoption of IOS: this literature has examined, among other things, the incentives for buyers and sellers to invest in IOS (Bakos, 1997) , how asset specificity and trust influence IOS adoption (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994) , the optimal ownership of IOS and the importance of network participants to asset productivity (Bakos and Nault, 1997), how external pressure and organizational readiness affect IOS adoption (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter, 2001) , how the codifiability of transactions influences their suitability for B2B exchanges (Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu, 2003) , and the impact of ownership on adoption and exploitation of IOS (Han, Kauffman and Nault, 2004 ).
The organizational and industry impact of IOS : This literature has examines the impact of IOS on firm size and scope (Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991) , on the number of suppliers and extent of outsourcing (Clemons, Reddi and Row, 1993; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993) , on firm size (Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil, 1994) , and on JIT (Just In Time) practices (Srinivasan, Kekre and Mukhopadhyay, 1994) . Prior work has also studied how network effects affect IOS adoption and impact (Riggins, Kriebel and Mukhopadhyay, 1994; Wang and Seidmann, 1995; Bhargava and Choudhary, 2004) , and the impact of specific technologies like voice mail on inter-organizational effectiveness (Lind and Zmud, 1995) . The relative benefits to different players in the value chain has also been investigated: to buyers in the auto industry (Mukhopadhyay, Kekre and Kalathur, 1995) , to buyers when IOS drives down search costs (Bakos, 1997 Clearly, this is a diverse and varied literature. Our work places most naturally in the third stream, since we study how an electronic market affects outsourcing and vertical integration. However, our model and results are different from the existing literature in a number of ways. In contrast to most earlier work, which studies the impact of IOS on individual firms or in buyer-supplier contexts, our work is situated at the level of the supply chain, with multiple tiers of buyers, suppliers and intermediaries. This approach is consistent with recent work (Straub, Rai and Klein, 2004) that highlights the need to study the impact of information technologies on the performance of networks of firms. It also highlights the role that different transaction costs, including search and agency costs, play in determining the vertical scope of organizations. It is well-established that electronic markets may decrease search costs (Bakos, 1997) . Moreover, Gurbaxani and Whang (1991) point out in their influential early paper that IT lowers agency costs as well as search costs.
In a typical value chain with multiple echelons, search costs may predominate in some parts of the supply chain, whereas agency costs may predominate in others. By modeling the interaction of search and agency costs, we make a unique new contribution to this literature.
Moreover, we recognize the fact that B2B search is complex, may depend on the nature of the input, and correspondingly, the impact of IT on search costs is not single-dimensional. For example, search for buyer-specific information involves the use of communication technologies (email, EDI, instant messaging, faxes, phones, letters), whereas search for generic, passive information involves the use of publication technologies (web pages, catalogs). Prior research has shown that price information is relatively easy to convey, whereas conveying product attribute information is more challenging (Bakos, 1997) . Parsing the collection of price information, we fine-tune earlier arguments by suggesting that in the context of B2B procurement, getting even the price of so-called commodity goods can be anything but straightforward, if the buyer has to determine terms specific to her case, such as delivery schedules, quantity discounts, commitment to quality levels, and so on.
Since buyer-specific terms are less likely to be published, the buyer has to engage in iterative communications with suppliers. In such circumstances, hierarchies (either bilateral long-term contracts or intra-firm governance) rather than markets may be the preferred governance mechanism. This seems consistent with Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, (1998), who describe evidence from the chemical industry, where electronic markets are not widespread despite chemicals being an easily described commodity product. It is also related to early work that suggested that electronic markets will be used for products that are low in asset specificity and complexity of description, and electronic hierarchies for products high on both dimensions (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987), an assertion supported by the empirical results of Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, (1998), and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) . Recent work in this direction (Granados, Gupta and Kauffman, 2005 ) finds that when asset specificity and product complexity are low, advanced IT facilitates the move from electronic hierarchies toward unbiased electronic markets. We add to this literature by studying how an electronic markets (featuring search costs) affects the choice between an electronic hierarchy (featuring agency costs) and an IT-mediated transaction-based relationship.
When electronic markets and IOS are widespread, intermediaries may not disappear -their roles can simply change (Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski, 1998) . This suggests that intermediaries have innate strengths, such as providing aggregation (Bhargava and Choudhary, 2004) , trust, lower operating costs, and matching services (Bailey and Bakos, 1997 ) that enable them to add value despite the presence of electronic markets and other IOS. We condense these innate advantages of intermediaries into the notion that they initially have lower search costs than the manufacturer.
This advantage could stem from intermediaries' greater investments in, and opportunities to acquire, domain specific knowledge, which has been shown to confer strategic advantage in technology mediated inter-organizational relationships (Christiaanse and Venkatraman, 2002) .
In addition to adding to the IS literature, our model makes a contribution to the related literature from industrial organization economics. Our approach is novel to the literature on firm boundaries in its focus on pre-contractual transaction costs (in our context, the costs of searching for appropriate trading partners) and their effects on the scope of firms. In contrast, most recent theories of firm boundaries focus on post-contractual opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) , the benefits of ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986) , and the relative viability of relational contracts based on unverifiable outcomes Murphy, 2001, 2002) .
We model vertical integration as a response to asymmetric information. Salient papers in this literature include Arrow (1975) , who models a downstream manufacturer who integrates backwards to gain timely access to upstream input prices, Riordan and Sappington's (1987) study of a retailer who must decide whether to integrate backward with a manufacturer, and Lewis and Sappington (1991) , which models the impact of production technology on a firm's decision to make or buy a part from a low-cost supplier whose cost and effort are unobservable. We also add to the literature on the role of middlemen, which in the past has examined competition among middlemen (Stahl, 1988 ; Fingleton, 1997), their impact on the efficiency of trade (Bloch and Ryder, 1994), and their impact on liquidity (Gehrig, 1993; Yanelle, 1989) and search costs (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Yavas, 1992). Spulber (1996) reviews the economics of intermediaries in greater detail.
We do not propose a new model of search, drawing instead from the analytical framework of Stahl (1989 Stahl ( , 1996 , since his specification most closely resembles the business scenario we analyze (in contrast with other models of search by Stigler, 1961 , Diamond, 1971 , Salop and Stiglitz, 1977 , Shilony, 1977 and Varian, 1980 . Finally, our model of a principal delegating costly search to a specialized agent may have applications beyond our paper, and is the first of its kind.
Model
There is a single downstream manufacturer (henceforth called the buyer ), who assembles and sells a finished product (the product) at an exogenously specified price π. In order to manufacture the product, the buyer needs a specialized part (henceforth called the part). Manufacturing the part requires a commodity input 5 (henceforth called the commodity). The commodity is supplied by a set of m competing tier-2 suppliers. Each tier-2 supplier chooses a (potentially different) commodity price. Due to potential price dispersion, the buyer is forced to engage in costly search, determining each potential tier-2 supplier's price until she discovers an acceptable price for the commodity. To keep things simple, we think of this as a quality adjusted price, which takes into account different delivery terms, quality differences and so on, and compares the "hedonic" prices associated with some standardized commodity input, to facilitate comparison between suppliers, and define a "lowest" price.
As is customary in the search literature, we assume that a small fraction μ of potential customers for the commodity are traders (or shoppers) who have a zero search cost and so will always simply ensures a smooth distribution of commodity prices in equilibrium, and they play no further substantive role in the model. Given c P , the tier-2 suppliers' mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategy 6 is denoted f * (p).
The buyer decides between making the specialized part in-house (insourcing) or buying it from the intermediary tier-1 supplier (outsourcing). If the buyer makes the part in-house, she searches for the best-priced commodity from the tier-2 suppliers, manufactures the part, and assembles it into the finished product. The cost of insourcing therefore comprises (i) search costs of evaluating each potential tier-2 supplier, at the rate of c P per supplier evaluated, (ii) direct costs of buying the commodity at price p, (iii) the cost of transforming the commodity into the part, and (iv) the manufacturing and assembling cost, to manufacture the product from the part. To focus on search costs associated with the procurement of the commodity, we normalize the costs of manufacturing the specialized part and the product to zero 7 .
The buyer may also outsource the part from a specialist intermediary (henceforth called the 6 Since the tier-2 sellers are identical, we focus on symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategies, consistent with Stahl, 1989. 7 This is equivalent to assuming that all parties have access to the same manufacturing technology for the part. The main results of the paper are not directionally affected by assuming positive (and different) part manufacturing costs, so long as electronic markets don't affect these costs. Since the buyer always incurs the product manufacturing cost, there is no loss of generality in normalizing this to zero. tier-1 supplier) who, by virtue of specialization, has a lower search cost c A . The buyer can observe the commodity price p obtained by the tier-1 supplier, but cannot observe the number of candidate tier-2 suppliers that the tier-1 supplier samples before buying the commodity. Since the part is specialized, and the tier-1 supplier bears idiosyncratic risk in supplying the part, we assume that the tier-1 supplier is risk-averse, with preferences represented by the utility function u(x), where x is the intermediary's payoff. u(x) is twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The outside opportunity of the intermediary is denoted u ≥ 0. All parties (that is, the buyer, the tier-1 suppliers, and the tier-2 suppliers) know u(x), u, c P , and c A .
In order to induce the tier-1 supplier to search optimally, the buyer offers the tier-1 supplier a contract [p + w(p)], which reimburses the tier-1 supplier for the price p of the commodity, and additionally specifies a performance-based wage w(p), where w(p) can be any function. The buyer's optimal contract must be designed to ensure participation from the tier-1 supplier (individual rationality), and to induce the tier-1 supplier to search optimally (incentive-compatibility). Therefore, the buyer benefits from the tier-1 supplier's lower search cost, but incurs hidden-action moral hazard costs when hiring the tier-1 supplier.
The payoffs under each option are as follows. If the tier-1 supplier (the agent) searches and obtains a commodity price p she receives a payment of [p + w * (p)], of which she pays p to the tier-2 supplier for the commodity, and derives utility of u(w * (p)) − (n − 1)c A , where n is the number of searches undertaken. Consistent with the literature on search, we assume the first search to be costless. The corresponding payoff to the buyer (the principal), who is risk-neutral, is π−[p+w * (p)].
If, on the other hand, the buyer chooses to manufacture the part in-house, her payoff from obtaining a commodity price p is π − [p + (n − 1)c P ], where n is now the number of searches undertaken by the buyer.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 2 .2. To decide whether to insource or outsource, 
Search costs, contracting, and make versus buy
The first part of this section derives the tier-2 suppliers' equilibrium pricing strategies, and the buyer's payoff from insourcing. The next part derives the optimal outsourcing contract, demonstrating that it has a simple two-part form, and characterizes the buyer's payoff from outsourcing.
The third part establishes that for any given buyer search cost, the buyer's make-buy choice is monotonic in the tier-1 supplier's search cost. The final part examines how organizational scope changes when search costs vary, by comparing the relative changes in the buyer's payoffs from insourcing and outsourcing, for different kinds of changes in search costs.
Insourcing
We first consider the buyer's payoff from insourcing, where the buyer procures the commodity directly from a tier-2 supplier, makes the intermediate part, and then makes the final product.
Suppose each tier-2 supplier chooses a symmetric mixed-strategy pricing strategy f (p) with support p ∈ [r 0 , p], and corresponding distribution function F (p). The following lemma, based on Stahl (1989), establishes that the optimal search strategy for the buyer is to search until a price below a cutoff price r P is found, or all tier-2 suppliers have been exhaustively sampled.
Lemma 1. The buyer's optimal search strategy for the tier-2 commodity is to search until a price less than or equal to a cutoff price r P has been obtained, or all tier-2 suppliers have been sampled, where r P is implicitly defined by:
Given Lemma 1, the equilibrium pricing strategy of the tier-2 suppliers should place zero probability on any value of p > r P , since no buyer (or trader) will purchase from a supplier whose price is higher than r P , and placing a probability
f (p)dp on the price r P is a profitable deviation from any strategy for which f (p) > 0 for p > r P . In other words, in the tier-2 suppliers' equilibrium strategy, p = r P .
The next lemma characterizes the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategy of the tier-2 suppliers.
Lemma 2. The unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium pricing strategy f * (p) for all tier-2 is specified by the following equations:
where F * (p) is the distribution function corresponding to the density f * (p)
Given this pricing strategy, the ex-ante expected payoff to the buyer from insourcing is simply
since the first tier-2 supplier sampled by the buyer is bound to have a price below the cutoff price r P , and the first search is costless for the buyer. Integrating (3.5) by parts and using (3.1) yields
Outsourcing
We next consider the buyer's payoff from outsourcing. The buyer's problem is to design the profitmaximizing contract p + w(p), while inducing incentive-compatible search on the part of the tier-1 supplier, and ensuring the tier-1 supplier's participation. We continue to maintain that c P , the search cost of the buyer, determines the equilibrium tier-2 commodity prices, and hence the pricing strategy for these suppliers continues to be as specified by Lemma 2.
Once the contract p + w(p) is specified, the tier-1 supplier will sample tier-2 suppliers until the expected gains from an additional search is less than the expected increase in expected utility.
Therefore, given any contract in which w(p) is non-increasing in p, there will be a cutoff price at which the tier-1 supplier stops searching. We formulate the buyer's problem for each such arbitrary cutoff price r A that the buyer may wish to induce the tier-1 supplier to stop searching at (we will subsequently choose the optimal r A ). Denote this contract for an arbitrary r A as p + w(p, r A ).
Given any such r A , the buyer must design w(p, r A ) so that r A is indeed the cutoff price at which the tier-1 supplier stops searching, which leads to the following incentive-compatibility constraint:
[IC] :
The contract must also ensure the tier-1 supplier's participation. The formulation of this participation constraint, and of the buyer's objective function are constructed by assigning the appropriate probability to each possible outcome for a cutoff price of r A -the details of this are available in Appendix B. Summing up, the buyer's contract design problem reduces to:
[IR] :
Solving the buyer's problem leads to the following proposition: the following simple structure:
Therefore, the buyer pays the tier-1 supplier the commodity price and (a) a constant higher wage The structure of the contract derived in Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3 .1. Despite the fact that the outcome set (price of the commodity obtained) is continuous, the nature of the agent's task (search) naturally lends itself to a partition of this space into favorable and unfavorable outcomes. This is because even when the payoffs are continuous and directly to the party searching (as is the case in the first-best), the decision rule for whether to search again is based on a deterministic cutoff price. Proposition 1 shows that this induces the principal (the buyer) to structure a contract that explicitly makes the payoff from the task of the agent (the tier-1 supplier) discrete. Additionally, the tier-1 supplier can take one of two (or in general, one of m) discrete actions (search once, twice), rather than having a continuous action space (as is the case in moral hazard models in which the agent chooses effort). This provides some intuition for why the optimal contract is discontinuous and flat, rather than varying smoothly with observed outcome p. Illustrates the profits from outsourcing and insourcing respectively, and how they vary with the buyer's choice of r A (the cutoff price which the tier-1 supplier is induced to stop searching at by the bilateral contract), for two candidate sets of parameter values. The figure below the profit curve illustrates that at the optimal value r A = r * A , the expected value of an additional search by the agent exactly balances the expected cost to the buyer (principal) of inducing this search. However, since r * A is strictly higher than the agent's first-best search strategy, the contract results in an effective increase in the magnitude of agent's search cost. In (a), which illustrates a lower value of c A , outsourcing is more profitable. In (b), which illustrates a higher value of c A , even the best choice of r A yields lower profits than those from insourcing, and so the buyer chooses to manufacture the intermediate part in-house.
The buyer choosing the value of r A that maximizes profits, given that their optimal contract for a fixed r A is as specified by Proposition 1. Rearranging the buyer's objective function, this optimal cutoff price r * A solves:
pf * (p)dp + 2
and the buyer's payoff from outsourcing is therefore
]dp].
Relative search costs and organizational scope
We now characterize the buyer's decision between outsourcing and insourcing. Clearly, the buyer
Comparing (3.5) and (3.12) and rearranging, outsourcing is optimal if the following condition is satisfied:
pf * (p)dp. The intuition behind this expression is straightforward. Given the optimal bilateral contract, the LHS of (3.13) is the expected payment to the tier-1 supplier; [2 − F * (r * A )]F * (r * A ) is the ex-ante probability of the favorable outcome, and [1 − F * (r * A )] 2 is the ex-ante probability of the unfavorable outcome. The RHS of (3.13) is the expected reduction in commodity prices as a consequence of the tier-1 supplier's superior search. Clearly, when the latter is greater than the former, the buyer prefers to outsource. Correspondingly, when the LHS of (3.13) is greater than the RHS of (3.13), the buyer prefers to insource.
The next proposition shows that this decision is monotonic in the tier-1 supplier's search cost Given c P , the existence of the threshold value c depends on whether the buyer ever chooses to outsource. If outsourcing is preferable when the tier-1 supplier has zero search costs (that is, for c A = 0), then an immediate corollary of (a) and (b) in Proposition 2 is that there is a positive threshold value c ∈ (0, c P ). On the other hand, if the tier-1 supplier's reservation utility is high enough, or the buyer's search cost low enough, to make insourcing optimal even when c A = 0, the buyer will choose to manufacture the intermediate part in-house for all c A > 0.
How electronic market technologies affect the extended enterprise
As we have discussed, an electronic market may change search costs for different firms across different tiers of the value chain to varying degrees. In this section, we first characterize how the organizational scope of an extended enterprise built around such an electronic market varies as there are differential changes in search costs across the manufacturer (buyer) and the tier-1 intermediary.
We then describe the nature of B2B search in some detail, link its characteristics to technologies that affect information intensive and communication-intensive search, and, integrating the nature of search with our analytical results, contrast the changes in the scope of the enterprise that the electronic market is thereby likely to induce.
Changes in organizational scope as search costs vary
In order to characterize directional changes in organizational scope in a general way, and only in contexts of interest, we do the following. We assume that under the status-quo (prior to the adoption of the electronic market), the buyer is indifferent between outsourcing and insourcing. This is equivalent to assuming that c A is at the threshold level c corresponding to c P , as described in Proposition 2. We then vary the search costs c A and c P in a systematic way, and establish whether the changes in search costs cause the buyer to insource or outsource. If the buyer insources as a consequence of the changes described, we conclude that search costs changes of that kind are likely to increase the organizational scope of an enterprise built around the electronic market.
Correspondingly, if the buyer outsources as a consequence of the changes in the search costs, we conclude that search costs changes of that kind are likely to decrease organizational scope, and lead to a more loosely coupled enterprise.
The first result, which follows directly from Proposition 2(a), establishes that if the electronic market causes search costs converge to a common value, this leads to a decrease in organizational scope.
Proposition 3. An electronic market that causes the search costs of both the buyer and the tier-1 supplier to converge to a common value results in higher organizational scope.
Sometimes, a precursor (or parallel activity) to the adoption of an electronic market may be the implementation of a common technology platform that spans many business processes, the associated re-engineering of these processes (Sanders, 2001) , and the adoption of best practice shared processes for functions like procurement across firms in the marketplace. If a tier-1 supplier's search cost advantage is embedded in a superior procurement process, this kind of re-engineering could potentially result in the convergence of the buyer and tier-1 supplier's search costs, and lead to an increase in the scope of the buyer firm.
Next, we examine the effects of a proportionate reduction in both c P and c A :
Proposition 4. An electronic market that causes the search costs of both the buyer and tier-1 supplier to reduce by the same constant proportion k < 1 -that is, from their original values c P , c A to new values kc P , kc A -results in higher organizational scope.
Intuitively, the result in Proposition 4 is driven by the invariance of the tier-1 supplier's outside alternatives, and the corresponding increased importance of the tier-1 supplier's outside opportunity when search costs decrease across the industry. This is the result underlying our subsequent discussion of communication-intensive search.
Finally, we establish the effects of a constant reduction in both c P and c A : This represents a reduction in search costs that takes the tier-1 supplier's search costs to zero. Since c P > c A , the buyer still has a positive search cost after the reduction, and consequently, finds it profitable to outsource. This is the result underlying our subsequent discussion of communication- 
Nature of product
Raw materials, processed materials, generic parts, specialized parts, capital equipment, MRO (maintenance, repair and operations), business services.
Procurement situation New task, modified rebuy, straight rebuy.
Recognition of need, specification determination and description, search for qualified suppliers, RFP, proposal analysis and evaluation, supplier selection, order routine specification, performance feedback and evaluation Figure 4 .2: Classifies B2B procurement based on the nature of the product and buying situation; also summarizes the steps in the B2B buying process.
Steps in the process
buyer chooses to insource. In contrast, when they each reduce by a constant factor τ to the point D, the buyer chooses to outsource.
The nature of B2B search
The prior subsection has characterized directional changes in the scope of the enterprise for different kinds of changes in search costs. While search costs tend to be reduced by electronic markets, it seems important to explore the connection between the nature of search in business-to-business transactions, and the corresponding extent of change in search costs, since, unlike consumer search, B2B search is quite involved, and requires substantial organizational resources. (2002) and Robinson, Faris and Wind (1967) . The types of products/situations that are generally considered search-intensive are highlighted, as are the steps in the process that are most likely to contribute to search costs. During this search process, buyers often must evaluate multiple vendor and product characteristics. This process often requires information acquisition from multiple sources. Dempsey (1978) identifies and classifies these attributes into five factors: basic economic criteria (price, quality, delivery), attendant services (repair, packaging), geographic affinity (location), assurance mechanisms (production facilities, delivery capability, control systems), and vendor stability (labor relations, management and organization).In addition, buyers must often engage in Highlighting these two dimensions of search is important, as our next two sections illustrate.
Information-intensive search
In general, information sources are classified as either personal or non-personal, and as commercial or non-commercial. Personal information sources are capable of providing specialized information directly addressing a specific buyer's concerns, whereas impersonal information sources provide general information that all potential buyers are likely to find useful. Commercial information sources are those that the seller provides -examples of personal commercial sources are salespeople and trade shows; of personal non-commercial sources are internal departments, outside consultants and colleagues; of impersonal commercial sources are trade-publication ads, sales literature and catalogs, and of impersonal non-commercial sources are trade press articles and rating services 9 .
We term the search information-intensive if it involves the acquisition and processing of a substantial amount of non-personal information. Many marketplace technologies substantially lower the cost of acquiring and evaluating this kind of information. Examples include online product catalogs, Internet-based supplier portals, and product/price comparison engines.
When marketplace participants gain access to these information systems, their search costs are therefore likely to reduce by a constant amount. This kind of constant reduction in search costs is especially likely in straight-rebuy situations, since it requires the evaluation of relatively few vendor and product attributes, using impersonal sources of information, and involves fewer decision makers. However, it is highly unlikely that search costs will reduce to zero, since there are still costly evaluation steps involved for each candidate supplier This kind of change in search costs is illustrated in Figure 4 .3, and as demonstrated by Proposition 5, our model predicts that it tends to lead to a reduction in organizational scope.
Communication-intensive search
Often, one thinks of search as being a simple process of information acquisition. However, our analysis of the industrial procurement process above has revealed that inter-entity (person, depart- The interorganizational systems in electronic markets reduce this cost of iterative communication significantly. For example, Covisint's Connect platform moves beyond EDI to provide it's marketplace participants with sophisticated any-to-any translation capability that can handle both EDI and XML technologies in one environment; their Communicate platform also serves as the framework for OEM-to-supplier and supplier-to-supplier communications. These information systems make each iteration of communication less expensive, faster, less error-prone, and richer. This may decreases the number of iterations required, probably by some fixed fraction, and also decreases the cost of each iteration, and therefore results in a proportionate decrease in search costs across firms. Recall that we had characterized differences in search costs between manufacturers and intermediaries as stemming from the number of communication iterations before the final terms are established, and prior expertise that makes this determination effective. This kind of change in search costs is illustrated in Figure 4 .4, and as demonstrated by Proposition 4, our model predicts that it will tend to lead to an increase in organizational scope.
Discussion and conclusions
Given that the IT infrastructure of Internet-based B2B electronic markets facilitates the interaction of a firm with a broader array of trading partners, and lowers the cost of transacting with them, it is therefore natural to conclude that these electronic markets will reduce the size of organizations.
Before coming to this conclusion, however, it is important to notice that the industries in which such markets are situated have complex and multi-tier supply chains, and a number of intermediaries owe their existence to their transaction cost and expertise advantages. Thus, the same changes that facilitate ease of transaction between firms across the supply chain may also cause these intermediaries to lose the advantages that lead to their activities being located outside the scope of the traditional downstream enterprise. In other words, they could well be disintermediated, and firms scope may increase, an outcome that is further favored by the lowering of moral hazard and incomplete contracting costs that accompany the move to a more vertically integrated enterprise.
Our paper has studied this trade-off, by integrating search theory, which models how changes in search costs caused by the marketplace systems affect input price distributions, with the hidden action principal-agent model, which forms the basis for analyzing the costs of bilateral contracting between an intermediary and a downstream manufacturer. Our results show that the resulting changes in enterprise scope and integration depend critically on the nature of search and the corresponding capabilities of the technologies associated with the electronic market.
Often, electronic marketplaces combine technologies that reduce the cost of acquiring published information with those that facilitate faster and less costly communication. In light of our results contrasting information intensive and communication intensive search, these have opposing effects on the desirability of vertical integration, and the resulting changes in organizational scope will thus depend on the relative information-intensity and communication-intensity of search. Returning to our introductory example, for MRO and indirect materials with well-specified characteristics, and a lower dependence on the firms' product design and other supplier relationships, search tends to be more information-intensive, whereas for direct materials, search tends to be more communicationintensive, and the relative pace at which PSP's have been adopted for each of these categories is therefore consistent with our model's predictions.
Our model predicts certain simple conditions under which industry-wide electronic business-tobusiness markets are likely to increase or decrease the vertical scope of the extended enterprise over time. A natural direction for future research would be towards confirming this direction of change empirically. This would involve a structured analysis and collection of data relating to the effects of marketplace technologies on search costs, and while our model provides the necessary theoretical basis and testable predictions for a first study, such data is likely to have immense value in studying other questions of importance to IS research as well.
There are several other contexts featuring both costly search, contracting under asymmetric information, and the delegation of costly search to an intermediary. Our model provides a first explanation for why these contracts are often "all or nothing." Our context is therefore part of a larger class of problems that investigate how differing search costs, and correspondingly, different search behavior across agents can affect the decision-making process of each of these agents (Rein- To summarize, we have studied how electronic business-to-business markets affect the vertical scope and integration of the extended enterprise, and the desirability of outsourcing. We characterize B2B search as being more complex than consumer search, and model three key effects that declining search costs induce: a change in the transaction costs of all firms; a change in the contracting costs associated with outsourcing, and a change in the price dispersion of input commodities.
Integrating the nature of B2B search with the details of the IT in an electronic market, our model predicts that when search is information-intensive, electronic markets will facilitate an increase in outsourcing and a reduction in organizational scope, whereas when it is primarily communicationintensive, electronic markets will lead to an increase in organizational scope. There are a variety of industries in which both technological and agency issues will influence the eventual success of global IT-facilitated extended enterprise initiatives, and we hope that our work will provide useful guidelines for companies who face increasingly challenging organizational design and governance decisions in these industries.
which can be rewritten as
dF (p) dp dp
F (p)dp.
2)
The buyer optimal cutoff price r P equates the benefit from additional search to the search cost c P , and therefore solves ∆(r P ) = c P .
SinceF (p) > 0 for p > r 0 , ∆(z) is strictly increasing in z, and therefore (7.3) has a unique solution, and the result follows. Proof. of Lemma 2: (Based on Stahl, 1989 ) Consider a candidate tier-2 supplier who faces the mixed strategy f (p) from its opponent. The profits from a choice of price p to this supplier can be reduced to
Substituting p = r P into (7.4) yields
The tier-2 supplier must make the same expected profit from each price in the support of their mixed strategy p ∈ [r 0 , r P ] . Substituting (7.5) into (7.4) yields µ
which yields
and therefore,
Using the fact that F (r 0 ) = 0 in (7.7) yields
From equation 3.1 we have c P =
, which completes the proof. Proof. of Proposition 1: Given a fixed r A , since π is fixed, the buyer's problem is equivalent to:
]dp ⎞ ⎠ (7.11) subject to : (w(p, r A ) )dp
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
Optimizing pointwise for w(., r A ) in the intervals [r 0 , r A ] and [r A , r P ] respectively yields first-order conditions that simplify to: = 0 (that is, using the fact that the conditions IC and IR will bind), and simplifying yields the functional forms for w H (r A ) and w L (r A ).
Proof. of Proposition 2: (a) Assume the converse -that is, when c A = c P , the cost of outsourcing is less than the cost of insourcing. Suppose now that the buyer insources and uses exactly the same search strategy as prescribed to the tier-1 supplier by the optimal bilateral contract (a cutoff of r * A ). This would lead to exactly the same ex-ante expected search costs (since c A = c P ), and the same ex-ante expected commodity price (since the search strategy is identical). This would also lead to costs that were weakly higher than the buyer's optimal insourcing search strategy. The fact that the cost of outsourcing is less than the costs of this optimal insourcing strategy imply that ex-ante expected wages are negative, which contradicts the fact that u > 0.
(b) The buyer chooses the stopping rule r A that maximizes the objective function:
Simplifying dΠ(r A ) dr A = 0 yields the following first-order necessary condition for this problem:
Now, from Proposition 1, we know that:
Differentiating both sides of (7.20) with respect to r A and rearranging yields:
Also, integration by parts yields the identity:
Furthermore, the optimal choice cutoff r * A should be such that having found a price r * A , the expected reduction in commodity price from a second search by the agent must exactly balance the increase in wages that this search entails, or 23) which implies that:
F * (p)dp. pf * (p)dp from (7.22) and
] from (7.24) into (7.18) and rearranging terms yields the simplified first-order condition: 25) which in turn implies that
Differentiating both sides of (7.26) with respect to c A and rearranging yields:
Since u 1 (x) > 0, u 11 (x) < 0, and w H 1 (r A ) < 0 from (7.21), the RHS of (7.27) is strictly positive, and therefore,
Now, using (7.24) and (3.1), and regrouping terms in the integrals, (7.17) reduces to: 28) and it is straightforward to verify that K(r A ) is strictly increasing in r * A . Since dr * A dc A > 0, the result follows.
Proof. of Proposition 3: This follows directly from Proposition 2(a).
The proof of Proposition 4 uses the following lemma, which is proved in the extended appendix. Proof. of Proposition 4: Lemma 3 implies that a straight line from the origin to (c A , c P )on the locus intersects the locus at exactly one point, this one, and since the locus is convex, the result follows.
Proof. of Proposition 5: Assume the converse. Therefore, there exists τ > 0 such that (c * P , c * A ) lies on the locus, while (c * P − τ , c * A − τ ) lies above the locus. This implies that
at (c * P , c * A ), and from Lemma 3, this implies that dc A dc P > 1 for each c P > c * P , which in turn means that at some point, c P = c A on the locus, contradicting Proposition 2(a). The result follows. indifferent between making the part in-house and outsourcing it, is given by the equation:
¢ dp + w L (r * A ) (8.1)
or by
The slope of the locus is simply dc A dc P = − ∂G/∂c P ∂G/∂c A (8.3)
where
In what follows, we denote ∂G ∂c P = G c P ,
∂ 2 G ∂c A ∂c P = G c A ,c P .First, we show that − c P > 0G. Differentiating both sides of (8.4) with respect to c P and using (3.10) and (3.4) to simplify yields:,
It can be verified that the expression ( 
where u L = u(w L (r * A )), i.e. wages paid when outcome is a higher-than-optimal-cutoff (r * A ) price for the raw material, and the subscript of u L 1 refers to the first derivative. Now, F (p)dp, the condition for optimal r * A from equation 7.24.
where u H = u(w H (r * A )), i.e. the wages paid when outcome is a lower-than-optimal-cutoff (r * A ) price for the raw material, and the subscript of u L 1 refers to the first derivative. Therefore, 
To show that
